It is not what the tool does with yours. The product is non-custodial: it reads your positions and prepares a transaction that you approve in your own wallet. We never hold your keys and never move your funds. This is published because a tool you can check is worth more than a promise, not because any of it happens on your behalf.
Where the money sits
The capital sits in a Safe smart account controlled by a hardware wallet — one owner, and every owner action signed on the device. Not a hot wallet with a key in a file on a server.
The automation holds its own keys, not the owner's. Routine jobs are run by keepers — machines that work on a schedule — and each keeper holds a key that can call one module and nothing else. On the HyperEVM positions there are three such jobs: sweeping collected fees, re-centring ranges, and topping up the keepers' own transaction fees from collected fees. Four modules are enabled to do them: the re-centring module was replaced with a new version on 30 October, and the one it replaced stays enabled, no longer moving funds, because the new one reads the shared move-rate limits and earmarks from it. A keeper key cannot change a module's settings, limits or destinations; only the owner can.
The fee-sweeping key can do exactly one thing: trigger a sweep that was already bounded when its module was deployed. If it leaked, an attacker could choose a sweep's timing, but not where it goes. For the re-centring and top-up keys, a review of the worst case if a key leaked is in progress, and we will state the result here.
What our automation is not allowed to do
The routine work runs as Safe modules — contracts the owner has explicitly enabled, which can do only what their code does. Four are enabled, for three jobs: one sweeps collected fees, one re-centres ranges, and one tops up the keepers' transaction fees. The fourth is the re-centring module replaced on 30 October, which stays enabled and no longer moves funds.
- where funds can go is written into the code. The fee sweeper and the gas top-up can only send to addresses compiled into them; whoever calls them, the money goes where it was always going to go. The gas top-up can send at most 0.3 HYPE a day, only to three fixed addresses: the two keepers and the owner's hardware wallet. The re-centring module cannot send funds anywhere except back to the owner's Safe.
- timing is enforced on-chain, not by the scheduler. The fee sweep refuses to run again until an interval has passed, measured by the chain's own clock. A machine that reboots, double-fires, or is asked to run twice cannot produce two sweeps. The chain is the authority, not our server.
- the code is immutable. None of the four sits behind a proxy or has an upgrade path, and the gas top-up has no settings at all.
- only the owner changes settings. The fee sweeper's per-sweep cap, maximum fee and keeper address, and the re-centring module's pause switch, keeper address, allowed range widths, slippage bound, how much of a position may be traded in one move, and how much may be put to work in one call, can be changed only by the Safe owner: called by anyone else, including a keeper, they revert. The re-centring module's numeric limits — the slippage bound, the trade limit and the amount put to work in one call — each have a ceiling written into the code that the owner cannot raise: the slippage bound, for example, can never be set above one per cent. The pause switch, the keeper addresses and the allowed range widths have no such ceiling.
- the owner can switch a module off in one transaction, without needing us, our servers, or our cooperation.
The modules were tested against a snapshot of the live chain before going near live funds. The re-centring module that went live on 30 October passed its suite of 49 tests, a 96-case matrix of fork scenarios and 12 chaos cases, and every defect deliberately introduced into its code was caught by at least one of its two mutation test sets. The gas top-up passed all 13 of its tests, and each of 7 introduced defects made them fail. Before the owner signed the new re-centring module in, a ten-point check of the deployed code passed on 30 October; a re-run on 2 November confirms the code on chain still matches the reviewed build.
How a range is handled
A concentrated liquidity position earns while the price sits inside its range and earns nothing while it sits outside. The obvious response is to move the range back quickly. It is not what these positions do, and that is the one thing our own measurements changed our mind about.
Re-centring is not a free repositioning. It withdraws at the current price, swaps to the ratio the new range needs, and re-deposits — turning a difference that was sitting on paper into a settled one, and paying a swap to do it. A position that drifts just past its edge and comes back has cost nothing if it was left alone.
So the rule is to hold through small excursions rather than chase them. When we priced impermanent loss exactly against these positions, the result pushed us the opposite way from where we expected: re-centring too often did not pay for itself. We publish that because it contradicts what is usually said, not because it flatters us.
Since 21 October, on the HyperEVM positions, a re-centre runs on its own once the owner has switched the job on. The keeper works out whether a move is due and carries it out within limits written into the module — how often it may run and how much it may swap — without a signature for each move. Switching the job on, and changing its limits, are signed by the owner. On Base, re-centres are still prepared and signed by hand. Waiting is not free either: in a steady one-way move a position that waits earns nothing while it sits outside its range and gives up more than one that follows the price. It is a trade-off chosen for choppy markets, and which kind of week it turns out to be is not knowable in advance.
What happens to the fees
Fees and rewards accumulate in the position until they are worth collecting. Collecting costs a transaction and sometimes a swap, so a sweep that fires on every small accrual loses money to gas and slippage. Ours run on an interval, above a floor, and skip silently when there is nothing worth moving.
Where they go is fixed in the module at deploy time, which is what makes the arrangement checkable: the destination cannot be changed by whoever happens to be running the scheduler.
What this does not give anyone
No arrangement here removes market risk. If both assets in a pair fall, the position falls with them, and no amount of architecture changes that. Bounded modules limit what the automation can do wrong; they do nothing about what the market does. A sustained trend in one direction costs money however the range is handled.
And to say it once more plainly: these are the founder's own positions, run with the company's tools. Your positions stay in your wallet, under your keys, and every action the tool prepares is one you approve yourself.